In this paper, we argue that the sizeable reduction in aggregate aid levels in the 1990's was due to the end of the Cold war. We use a dynamic econometric speciÞcation to test this hypothesis on a panel of 17 donor countries, spanning the years 1970-1997. We Þnd aid to be positively related to military expenditures in the former Eastern bloc, and that the substantial drop in these expenditures can indeed explain the reduction in aid in the 1990's. These Þndings complement previous results in the aid allocation literature that aid is used strategically. * We are indebted to Timothy Besley, Per Pettersson-Lidbom, David Strömberg, Peter Svedberg, Jakob Svensson and, in particular, Torsten Persson for comments and suggestions, and we thank Christina Lönnblad for editorial assistance.
Introduction
The aggregate level of development aid dropped substantially in the 1990's. This is illustrated in In this paper we suggest that the explanation might lie elsewhere, namely in the end of the Cold war. According to political rhetoric, the purpose of development aid is altruistic with the reward for aid donations being the warm glow from giving to people in need. However, this altruistic motive has long been questioned by observers in this Þeld, arguing that foreign aid has also been used for the donors' own foreign policy interests. 2 In this paper we test the speciÞc hypothesis that foreign aid has been used strategically to gain political allies in the developing world in order to enhance the donors' own security in case of a military conßict with the Eastern bloc. It is well-known that the Western and Eastern blocs supported regimes and guerillas in the developing world on ideological grounds in the bipolar world of the Cold war, and it is straightforward how foreign aid may have served as an instrument in this ideological struggle.
1 See World Bank (1998). 2 See, for instance, McKinley and Little (1977) for one of the earlier contributions to this strand of literature.
Financial support can be made conditional on political loyalty, and, through fungibility, it may have served indirectly as a Þnancial contribution to armed struggles against political enemies. 3 This means that the end of the Cold war, and the subsequent decrease in the military threat, may have caused a reduction in the motivation for aid, offering a potential explanation for the fall in aid levels in the 1990's.
Support for the idea that aid is strategically used can be found in the empirical literature on aid allocation. In particular, Alesina and Dollar (2000) Þnd that recipient countries get more aid if voting in line with the donors in the general assembly of the United Nations, and that aid allocation is greatly inßuenced by former colonial status. Another example is Maizels and Nissanke (1984) , who Þnd total aid receipts to be positively related to transfers of arms from the major donors in 1969-1970 and 1978-1980 . This strand of literature is well suited for Þnding the underlying pattern determining the allocation of aid, and thereby the size of the aid budgets in the recipient countries. However, the literature takes the total supply of aid as given, which makes it is less suitable for answering questions concerning the size of the aid budget in the donor countries. The two approaches are clearly complementary though, in the sense that they represent different ways to understand the motives behind aid by using different types of data.
In a simple theoretical model we develop a framework to identify the impact of the end of the Cold war on the size of the aid budgets in donor countries. The model shows that the temperature of the Cold war matters if aid is used as an instrument in the donor countries' own military security functions. We obtain the testable hypothesis that donor countries give more aid in times of increased security risk, since political loyalty from aid recipients then becomes more important. This, and other predictions from the model are tested on a panel of 17 donor We Þnd that total aid is signiÞcantly and positively affected by the external threat faced by the donor countries in support of our main hypothesis. The results are robust to a number of different speciÞcations of the model and alterations of the data set. We also Þnd that the substantial drop in the military expenditures of the Eastern bloc in the 1990's is sufficient in size to explain the large reduction in aid levels in the same period. An important implication is that the recent reduction in total aid levels is not only a result of a temporary downturn in the business cycle, but arises from a possibly permanent reduction in the military threat. In accordance with the Þndings in Alesina and Dollar (2000), we also Þnd that donors differ in their behavior; the three largest donors, the United States, Japan and France, appear to act most strategically. 4 To our knowledge, only two papers in the previous aid literature try to empirically determine the size of the aid budgets in the donor countries. Beenstock (1980) Þnds that macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment, the budget deÞcit and real GDP levels, are important in determining the aid level. Mosley (1985) Þnds that only the commitments of the past year, and the commitments of other donors in the past year have a signiÞcant impact on the aid level, when using a panel of countries. Neither of these papers tries to analyze the purpose of foreign aid though, and they do not relate aid expenditures to military threat -the main purpose of our paper. Our work also relates to the quite extensive literature on military expenditures. 5 The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops a conceptual framework; Section 3 4 It would seem of interest to study whether private ßows and ODA are substitutes. During the 1990s there has in fact been a surge in private ßows, while ODA fell dramatically. Private ßows are however very volatile and concentrated to a few, middle-income countries, while ODA is mainly directed towards low-income countries. It is therefore not likely that private ßows substitute for ODA. 5 For surveys of the literature, see Smith (1995) and Sandler and Hartley (1995) .
discusses the empirical implementation of the model; Section 4 presents the results; and Section 5 checks their robustness, while Section 6 concludes.
A Conceptual Framework
In this section, we develop a simple model, where aid can serve as an instrument for the donor countries' own military security. There are three goods in the model, one private good, x, and two public goods, external security, S, and poverty alleviation, P . The economy is populated by n identical individuals, who earn an exogenous per capita income, y. The utility function is written in a general, but separable form, and is assumed to be continuous and concave in all its arguments,
Following the literature, external security is assumed to increase in the country's own military expenditures, M, and decrease in the military expenditures of the enemy country, M e . To introduce the main hypothesis, we allow security to increase in the level of aid, A. Hence, aid may serve as a complement to military expenditures in the production of security, but it is also the instrument for poverty alleviation. The security and poverty alleviation technologies are given by
where V (M) and W (A) are concave and twice differentiable and α ∈ [0, 1] captures the potentially strategic element of aid disbursements. Public goods are Þnanced by an income tax, τ , and budget balance is required. The representative individual maximizes
subject to
The Þrst-order conditions of the optimization problem implicitly deÞne the solutions for A * and M * as continuous functions of the exogenous variables 6 :
Straight forward comparative statistics reveal that (i)
and (iii)
Moreover, comparative statistics also give that 3 Empirical Implementation
The Data Set
To estimate the model speciÞed in the preceding section, we have constructed a panel data set ranging from 1970 to 1997 and containing 17 donor countries. 7 As a measure of aid, we use the OECD deÞnition of Official Development Assistance (ODA), which includes bilateral aid and contributions to multilateral institutions. 8 As an indicator of the enemy's military expenditures, we use the aggregate military expenditures of the Warsaw Pact (WP) before 1990, and thereafter the sum of the military expenditures of the countries that belonged to WP. 9 The motivation for using the expenditures of all the WP countries is that during the Cold war there were two superpowers, the US and the USSR; if a country was allied with one of these, it automatically became the adversary of the other. In this respect, all donor countries in the sample had the USSR, and hence the WP, as their enemy during the period of analysis. 10 In Appendix A, we list the variable deÞnitions and sources, and in Appendix B, we present some descriptive statistics of the data. The correlation matrix in Table BI indicates no signiÞcant relationship between our measure of military threat and aid levels, but as will be evident below, this picture changes when controlling for other variables by multiple regression. In Table BII , the descriptive statistics show that there is a fair amount of variation in our variables. Table   BIII reports the distribution of the country-speciÞc means and standard deviations, which reveal quite a large heterogeneity both in the panel dimension (the distribution of the country-speciÞc 7 The sample includes all countries that were members of the OECD Development Association Committee (DAC) in the entire period, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
means) and the time dimension (the distribution of the country-speciÞc standard deviations); the variation is particularly large for our dependent variable.
Econometric Specification of the Model
Our goal is to estimate aid as deÞned in equation (1) . This means that we estimate a reduced form of the theoretical model. 11 For simplicity, we presume that a log-linear model captures the functional form of the demand equation for aid,
where α it is the constant term in period t for country i, T HREAT is the level of military expenditures of the enemy and the error term, ² it , is assumed to be normally distributed and
There are reasons to believe that the demand equation for aid should have a dynamic speciÞcation. As already pointed out in Wildavsky (1964), the current year's spending in any public agency is predominantly inßuenced by last year's budget. According to Mosley (1985) , this is particularly true for aid agencies, since aid projects often run over several years, with Þnancial ßows being committed already in year one. To shed light on the dynamic speciÞcation, we follow the procedure suggested in Maddala (1987) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982 it is desirable to allow for these differences by the use of country speciÞc intercepts. Second, the dimension of our panel is signiÞcantly smaller than the number of time periods. While it is well-known that the Þxed effects estimator generates biased results in a dynamic panel, the bias decreases in the number of time periods and vanishes as t goes to inÞnity. The FE-estimator is therefore recommended when working with data-sets of our dimensions since the alternative unbiased estimators are less efficient; see for example, Attanasio, Picci and Scorcu (2000) and Judson and Owen (1999) . Finally, the countries in our sample constitute, in principle, the whole population of the donor countries, so it is appropriate to treat the individual effects as Þxed rather than random. The econometric model we estimate is thus formulated as
The difference from the speciÞcation in equation (3) is that the constant term, α i , is country speciÞc but constant across time, and that last year's aid expenditures are included on the right-hand side. 13 The procedure suggested in Maddala (1987) actually consists of two parts. First, it is tested whether a serial correlation model is to be used. For this purpose, reformulate a serial correlation model yit = β 0 xit + αi + wit with wit = ρwit−1 + uit as follows:
If there is serial correlation in the errors, then the coefficient of the lagged independent variables should be equal to minus the product of the coefficients of current x and lagged y. Secondly, once it is established that a serial correlation model should not be used, one tests whether ρ = 0.
14 We only use one year lags, because additional lags turned out to be insigniÞcant, and did not have a fundamental impact on the other estimates.
The Main Results
Column 1 in Table 1 shows the results of estimating equation (4) . The table reports coefficient values and standard errors within brackets. We use *** to denote the signiÞcance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
All variables have the expected signs and, except for POP, the results are signiÞcant at the 1 percent level. The results indicate that aid expenditures are relatively persistent, with a coefficient value of 0.69 on the lagged dependent variable. This is in line with the Þndings in Mosley (1985) . The (short-term) income elasticity is 0.49, which means that aid increases less than proportionally to an increase in per capita GDP, implying that aid is considered to be a necessity rather than a luxury good in our sample of countries.
The positive correlation between THREAT and AID is of particular interest, yielding support to our hypothesis that aid has been used as an instrument for the donor countries' own military security. Reviewing the small literature estimating the size of foreign aid suggests two variables not included in the basic speciÞcation of our model. Both Beenstock (1980) and Mosley (1985) mention unemployment and budget deÞcits as important explanatory variables. The argument for both is that there may be obvious incentives to cut down aid expenditures and redirect funds towards domestic expenditures in bad times. An additional variable that may be relevant is aid to more advanced Central and Eastern European Countries and new independent states of the former Soviet Union. This variable is not included in the deÞnition of ODA used as our dependent variable, however these countries emerged as aid recipients in the 1990's, after the break-up of communism in the Eastern bloc. 16 A crowding-out effect may therefore be another potential explanation for the drop in our measure of aid in the last decade.
Column 2 in Table 1 presents the results of including these variables in the regression. 17 We Þnd that neither of these variables enter signiÞcantly, and that their inclusion has a negligible impact on the variables of the base speciÞcation. This may be somewhat surprising, but it 16 See OECD (1995) for more details on the subject. 17 BUDGET is deÞned as the budget surplus as a percentage of nominal GDP, UN as the unemployment ratio and CEECAID as the logarithm of aid to the CEEC countries. BUDGET is instrumented by its lagged value to avoid potential endogeneity problems due to the fact that aid expenditures are part of the government budget.
should be emphasized that we control for GDP per capita in this regression, so that the effect of a general economic recession is already captured by this variable.
The breakdown of the former Eastern bloc led to a political and economic reorientation towards market liberalism and democracy in most of these countries, resulting in a relative normalization of international politics in the 1990's. We therefore Þnd it interesting to check whether there was a structural break in the coefficient values around 1989. To test this hypothesis, we create a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 in the years 1990 to 1997, and 0 elsewhere. We then interact this dummy variable with our independent variables to see if the coefficient values are signiÞcantly different in the 1990's. The results are presented in Table 1 , column 3. The interaction dummies of THREAT and GDP are indeed signiÞcant, indicating that the marginal impact on the size of the aid budget from an increase in military expenditures of the former Eastern bloc has decreased substantially in the 1990's (though it is still positive), while a larger share of an increase in income is now devoted to aid.
Another variable of interest is PARTY, which is a dummy deÞned as 1 if the country had a right-wing government in a given year and 0 otherwise, according to the classiÞcation in Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997). The hypothesis we want to test is if left-wing governments act less strategically than right-wing governments, with respect to the size of the aid budget. 18 Therefore we have interacted the PARTY dummy with the other variables to see if there is any signiÞcant difference between the two political blocs in their reaction to a change in any of the exogenous variables. However, as is shown in Table 1 , column 4, all interaction terms appear to be insigniÞcant, thus lending no support to this hypothesis.
Finally, Alesina & Dollar (2000) show that four of our donor countries, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and Australia, give between 78 and 53.7 per cent of their aid to former colonies.
(For the remaining countries in our sample, the Þgure is below 23 per cent.) Through interaction effects, we have studied whether these four countries determine their total aid expenditures any differently from the rest of the sample. Column 5 in Table 1 indicates that the former colonial powers are less sensitive to changes in GDP, while all other interaction terms fail to be signiÞcant. Table 2 In this model, the coefficient values on THREAT for Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom are insigniÞcant, while they remain signiÞcant for Australia, the United States, Japan and France. This indicates that strategic concern in allocation of aid also is reßected in strategic concern with respect to the size of the aid budget.
Country-Specific Results
The group of countries with positive and signiÞcant coefficients on THREAT thus consists of 7 out of the 17 countries in our base speciÞcation, and only 4 out of 17 countries when including the budget surplus as an explanatory variable. However, the United States, Japan and France are the three largest donors, and they alone account for 54 percent of the total aid ßows in the sample. Hence, even if only a minority of the countries responds to changes in the military threat, the impact on the aggregate aid level is likely to be substantial.
Robustness of the Results
The sensitivity analysis focuses on four potential pitfalls in our estimation approach. The Þrst concern emerges from the analysis of country-speciÞc slope coefficients in the previous section.
It regards whether it is appropriate to assume poolability across donor countries: as shown, e.g., by Pesaran and Smith (1995) , incorrectly pooling data yields inconsistent estimates in a dynamic panel. To address this problem, we also estimate our basic equation using the HildrethHouck random coefficients model. This model treats the coefficient vector as a realization of a stochastic process, and as suggested in Swamy (1971) , the estimator is computed as a precision weighted average of panel-speciÞc OLS estimators. The results in column 1 of Table 3 are by and large consistent with the results using the Þxed effects estimator. In fact, the coefficient values do not vary dramatically (with the exception of POP) or change signs. The coefficient value on THREAT increases somewhat from 0.068 to 0.092, which is in line with the results of the individual country regressions, where the coefficient values are, in general, higher in countries with more precise estimates. As expected, the standard errors are somewhat higher when we relax the homogeneity assumption, but AID t−1 , GDP and THREAT are still signiÞcant at the 1-percent level.
Another potentially serious deÞciency concerns that the variable identifying the strategic use of aid in our estimations, i.e. the level of military expenditures in the former WP, is common to all donor countries in the panel. As pointed out in Moulton (1990) , if there are year-speciÞc unobservable characteristics that are common across panels, standard errors from OLS regressions can be seriously downward biased in the prescence of common explanatory variables. In Table 3 , we present the results from two different approaches dealing with this potential problem. In Column 2, we have used the Þxed effect estimator, but with standard errors corrected for potential heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the error terms, as suggested in Moulton (1990) . The standard errors increase as expected, but the estimated coefficients remain signiÞcant at the 1-percent level. Another way of dealing with the issue of a common variable is to include other common variables that may have had an impact on the pattern of aid, to see how these affect the correlation between THREAT and AID. For this purpose, we introduce two other common variables, one measure of the worldwide business cycle and one measure of the worldwide level of GDP, into our base speciÞcation. 19 Both common variables fail to be signiÞcant, and their inclusion have basically no impact on the size or signiÞcance of the THREAT variable coefficient, as shown in Table 3 , column 3. 20 A third possible concern is potential endogeneity with respect to the THREAT variable. If aid is used as an instrument for military security in the West, it can be argued that Western aid may have had an impact on the level of military expenditures in the former WP. Finding appropriate instruments is a very difficult task in this case, however. What we can do is to use lagged values of THREAT as instruments in an attempt to remedy this potential pitfall. Table   3 , column 4, shows the result from running an instrumental variable regression, using last years value of THREAT as an instrument for this year's value. The coefficient value on THREAT remains within the same range as before, and the t-statistics actually increases.
The Þnal dimension of our sensitivity analysis concerns the sample of countries and the time 19 The proxy for the worldwide business cycle is constructed as the sum of the growth rates in real GDP in the seven largest economies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States), weighted by their shares of GDP in total GDP. The measure of the overall level of GDP is constructed as the sum of the levels of GDP in all countries in the sample, weighted by their shares of total GDP. 20 We have also tried with linear and quadratic time trends. There is no real economic reason to assume a trend in aid expenditures, apart what may be driven by an increasing trend in GDP per capita, but a time trend may catch some omitted and common variable that we cannot identify, such as aid fatigue. However, irrespective of how we enter these trends, separately or jointly, they always enter non-signiÞcantly and have basically no impact on the coefficient values of our explanatory variables. In the case when we enter both a linear and a quadratic trend jointly the t-statistic of the threat variable drops, but it remains signiÞcant at the 5-percent level. Surprisingly, the time trend enters monotonically increasing, which indicates that our measure of the military threat does a good job in explaining the non-monotonicity in aid levels.
span. Since our sample consists of the complete set of members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee during these years, we have difficulties in expanding our set of countries.
But, we can experiment with dropping different countries to check that no single country drives our result. In fact it might be suspected that outliers would weigh heavily in the results. The United States has, for example, had the highest level of military expenditures while, at the same time, being one of the countries giving the least foreign aid in terms of per capita, or as a share of GDP. Therefore we have reestimated our Þxed effect aid equation excluding, one at a time, the United States, as well as all other countries. This does not change our coefficient values or their signiÞcance more than marginally. It should also be emphasized that the positive impact of THREAT on AIDPC remains highly signiÞcant, even if we restrict the sample to some range between 1970-1990 and 1970-1986 . The signiÞcant correlation is thus not only due to the events in the 1990's.
Conclusions
We have tried to answer the question why the aggregate supply of development aid decreased so substantially in the 1990's. In particular, we have focused on the potential role of the end of the Cold war, and presented a simple theoretical framework for why this should affect the size of the aid budgets in the donor countries. The testable implication from the model is that aid levels should be related to the donors' perceived military threat. This hypothesis is tested on a dynamic panel of 17 donor countries, using the military expenditures of the former Eastern bloc as a proxy for the military threat.
We Þnd the level of total aid to be signiÞcantly and positively affected by the external threat faced by the donor countries. We also Þnd that the substantial drop in Eastern bloc military expenditures during the 1990's is sufficient to explain the size of the reduction in aid levels in the same period. The important implication of this result is that the recent reduction in total aid levels is not only a result of a temporary downturn in the business cycle, but arises from a possibly permanent reduction in the military threat. The decrease in aid levels is thus likely to be as permanent as the end of the Cold war, unless the preferences for aid as poverty alleviation increase signiÞcantly, even though we Þnd support for a structural break in 1990, indicating that the marginal impact of a change in the military expenditures of the former WP countries has decreased. In accordance with previous studies, we also Þnd that donors differ in terms of strategic behavior, with the three largest donors, the United States, Japan and France, acting most strategically. Finally, we Þnd the level of aid to be quite persistent, and increasing in the level of per capita GDP. However, we do not Þnd any signiÞcant impact of the size of the budget surplus, the unemployment rate or population size, and we could not support the hypotheses that aid to the former Eastern bloc should crowd out aid to the south. Nor do we Þnd any support for the hypothesis that right-wing governments respond differently to changes in our independent variables than do left-wing governments , or that donor countries allocating a large part of their aid to former colonies determine their total amount of aid differently than other countries. Table 4 shows the results from using the Þxed effect estimator. All variables are signiÞcant at the 1-percent level and with the expected signs. The military expenditures are quite persistent in our sample, though somewhat less so than aid, and expenditures increase with the level of per capita GDP, the military expenditures of the former WP countries and the size of the population. 
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